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[Crim. No. 6598. In Bank. May 13, 1960.] 
In re WILLIAM EDMUND GROVES, on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Licenses--Power to License or Tax: Subjects.-Whether or 
not state law has occupied the field of regulation, cities may 
tax businf.'sses eal'l'ied on wit.hin their boundnl'ies and enforce 
such taxes by requiring business licenses for revenue and by i 
criminal penalties. (Gov. Code, § 3710i.) \ 
[2] ld.-Subjects-Practice of Profession.-The state can delegate l 
to a municipality the power to impose a tax for the privilege 
of following the practice of a profession within the jurisdiction 
of the municipality. 
[3] ld. - Power to License or Tax - License Tax for Revenue. -
Where a city seeks to enforce its licensing ordinance against a 
manufacturer and seller of ice cream products for revenue 
only, such taxation is not excluded because the state has occu-
pied the field of regulation. 
[4] ld.-Power to License or Tax-License Tax for Revenue.-A 
provision of a city ordinance precluding the application of the 
criminal penalties provided therein, added to the ordinance to 
make "it clear that the business fees imposed are for revenue 
only," does not make lawful the earrying on of a business 
without a license, dispense with the obligation to secure a 
license, or exclude the application of the state criminal penalty 
for carrying on a: business without a license required by law. 
[5] ld.-Statutory Provisions.-Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16240, mak-
ing it a misdemeanor for any person to carry on a business 
or trade for which a license is required without taking out or 
procuring the license required by law, was added to the code 
when the Legislature repealed identical provisions of Pen. Code, 
§ 435, at which time (1941) it was settled that a city ordinance 
was a law of the state within the meaning of § 435. By trans-
ferring the statute from the Penal Code to the Business and 
Professions Code, the Legislature did not change the meaning 
of its terms. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2.) 
[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Licenses, §§ 7, 37 ct seq.; Am.Jur., Licenses, 
§§ 7, 47. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Licenses, §§ 3,21; [2] Licenses, § 26; 
[3, 4] Licenses, § 7(2); [5] Licenses, § 5; [6] Habeas Corpus, 
§ 22(11); [7] Licenses, § 12. 
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[6] Habeas Corpus-Defective Accusatory Pleading-Complaint.-
Where a cOillplaint charging the operntnr of a "milk products 
plant" with the mi,,;t!elll('anor of operating hi~ bllsine~s withuut 
having first seeured a bu~iness license as l'('qnired by a city 
ordinance stated. the precise facts made a lllisdemeanor. by 
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16240, such operator was fully informcd 
of the charges against him and was in no way prejudiced hy 
failure of the complaint to cite § 16240. Under such circum-
stances failure to cite the code section in the complaint was 
not ground for setting aside the .iudgnl!~nt of conviction on 
habeas corpus. 
[7] Licenses-Va.lidity of Ordinances.-The operator of a "milk 
products plant" could not successfully contend that it was a 
denial of equal protection of the laws to enforce the criminal 
penalties of a city ordinance against tho;;e not required to 
have state licenses but not to enforce such penalties against 
those required to have such licenses, where the penalties of the 
ordinance have not been invoked against him, and Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 16240, whirh he violated, npplies equnlly to all 
persons required. to have licenses. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from cus-
tody. Writ denied, and petitioner remanded to custody. 
William O. Burt for Petitioner. 
Jerome J. Bunker, City Attorney (Palm Springs), for Re· 
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-By petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
petitioner challenges his conviction of engaging ip business 
in the city of Palm Springs without a license as required by 
the Palm Springs Ordinance Code. \Ve issued an order to 
show cause directed to the Chief of Police of Palm Springs 
and ordered petitioner released on his own recognizance. 
Petitioner secured a state lieense to operate a "milk products 
plant" in Palm Springs for the manufacture and sale at retail 
of ice cream products. (Agr. Code, §§ 660-661.) He contends 
that the state statutes establish a complete system for the 
licensing and regulation of his business and that the city 
cannot therefore require him to secure an additional license 
to conduct that business. The city contends that the state 
statutes have not occupicd the field of regulation of businesses 
such as petitioner's aud that in any event its licensing ordi-
nance does not conflict with state regulatory laws, since as 
applied to petitioner, the ordinance requires a business license 
for rcvenue only. 
/~) 
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Chaptcl'S 21 and 22 of the Palm Springs Business License 
Ordinance (division 2 of the Palm Springs Ordinance Code) 
provide for the licensing of businesses and the payment of 
business license fces hy those engaged in business in the city. 
Section 2111 of chapter 21 provides that "It is unlawful 
for any person (whether as owner, manager, principal, agent, 
clerk, employee, officer or lessee, either for himself or for any 
other person, or for any body corporate, or as an officer of 
any corporation, or otherwise) to commence, manage, engage 
in, conduct or carryon any business, vocation, profession, 
calling, show, exhibition or game, in Chapters 21 and 22 
specified, in this City, without first having procured a license 
from the City of Palm Springs to do so or without first com-
plying with any and all regulations for such business, voca-
tion, profession, calling, show, exhibition or game contained 
in Chapters 21 and 22." Section 2131 provides that no person 
shall be licensed to carryon an activity requiring a state 
license unless hc has such a license, section 2133 provides that 
no person shall be licensed to carryon an activity requiring 
a permit under some other city ordinance unless he has secured 
such a permit, and section 2135 provides that no person shall 
be licensed to carryon an activity at a place where the activity 
is prohibited by a zoning ordiuance. Other provisions of 
chapter 21 set forth the conditions on which the city council 
may issue special permits for activities requiring such permits, 
additional regulations applicable to peddlers and solicitors, 
and remedies for enforcement of the licensing ordinance in-
cluding the collection of the business license fees set forth in 
chapter 22. The fee applicable to petitioner's business is 
$100 per year. 
Although the ordinance provides generally both for the 
regulation of the businesses involved and the collection of reve-
nue by business license fees, it has been invoked specifically 
against petitioner solely for revenue purposes. Other than the 
requirements with respect to state licenses and zoning, which 
are not here involved, the ordinance contains no provisions 
regulating the conduct of plaintiff's business. 
[1] Whether or not state law has occupied the field of 
regulatjon, cities may tax businesses carried on within their 
boundaries and enforce such taxes by requiring business li-
censes for revenue and by criminal penalties. (Gov. Code, 
§ 37101; In re Galusha, 184 Cal. 697, 699 [195 P. 406] ; Frank-
lin v. Peterson, 87 Ca1.App.2d 721, 731 [197 P.2<l 788] ; City 
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351] ; In re Johnson, 47 Cal.App. 465, 468 [HIO P. 852] ; s<'e 
also Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Ca1.2d 465, 476c·!"i7 [211 P.2<l 
564] ; Horwith v. City of Frcsno, 74 Cal.App.2d 443, 445 
[168 P.2d 767].) This court stated the applieable law when 
it discharged a writ of habeas corpus sought by an attorn<'y I 
who had been arrested for carrying on the practice of law in 
the city of Los Angeles without paying the license tax imposed 
by a city ordinance. [2] "As in the case of other profes-
sions or businesses which can be taxed by the state, the cases 
hold that the state can delegate to a municipality the power 
to impose a tax for the privilege of following the practice of 
the profession within the jurisdiction of the muuicipality. 
[Citations.] The imposition of an occupational tax by a 
municipality upon those engaged in the practice of the lcgal 
profession is not an interference with state affairs. The 
mere compliance with certain prerequisites, in return for which 
a license to practice law is granted by the state, does not place 
a person beyond the range of additional regulation of the 
conditions upon which the license may be used. The munici-
pality, in imposing an occupational tax upon attorneys, is not 
interfering with state regulations, for it is not attempting to 
prescribe qualifications for attorneys different from or addi-
tional to those prescribed by the state. It is merely proyiding . 
for an increase in its revenue by imposing a tax upon those 
who, by pursuing their profession within its limits, are de-
riving benefits from the advantages especially afforded by the 
city. The tax is levied upon the business of practicing law, 
rather than upon a person because he is an attorney at law. 
[Citation.} A license to practice does not carry with it 
exemptions from taxation." (In re Galusha, s1lpra.) 
Petitioner contends, however, citing Agnew v. City of Los 
Angeles, 51 Cal.2d 1 [330 P.2d 385}, Agnew v. City of Culver 
City, 51 Ca1.2d 474 [334 P.2d 571], and Agnew v. City of Cul-
1)61" City, 147 Cal.App.2d 144 [304 P.2d 788], that city busi-
ness taxes may not be enforced against persons licensed under 
state law by requiring them to secure business licenses or 
suffer criminal penalties. In the Agnew cases the licen~e fees 
were not imposed solely for re"'enue purposes but as an insep-
arable part of a regulatory scheme excluded by state law. 
(See also Agnew v. City of Los Anaelrs, 110 Cal.App.2d 612, 
619-623 [243 P.2d 73] ; Lynch v. City of Los Angeles, 114 
Cal.App.2d 115, 118-120 [249 P.2<l 856] ; Cify & County of 
San Franci.~co v. Boss, 83 Ca1.App.2d 445,452 (189 P.2d 32].) 
[3] In the present case, however, the city seeks to enforce 
) 
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its licensing ordinance against pctitioner for revenue only, 
and as the Agncw cases expressly rccognized, such taxation 
is not excluded because the state has occupied the field of 
regulation. (51 Ca1.2d 1, 7 [330 P.2d 385] ; 51 Ca1.2d 474, 
477 [334 P.2d 571]; 147 Cal.App.2d 144, 149 [304 P.2<l 788].) 
[4] Petitioner contends, however, that by express pro-
vision the ordinance excludes criminal enforcement against 
him. Section 2132.1 provides that "The criminal penalties 
provided for by this Code shall not be applied to businesses 
or professions requiring a State license as a condition precedent 
to doing business in the City, nor as a method of obtaining 
collection of the license fees." This provision was added to 
the ordinance in 1959 following the decisions of this court in 
the Agnew cases to make "it clear that the business fees im-
posed are for revenue only and clearly collectible within the 
meaning of the decisions of the Supreme Court of this State." i 
(Palm Springs Ordinance No. 444.) Although section 2132.1 
precludes the application of the criminal penalties provided 
by the Palm Springs Ordinance Code, it does not make lawful 
the carrying on of a business without a license, dispense with 
the obligation to secure a license (Business License Ordinance, 
§ 2111, sup"a), or exclude the application of the state criminal 
penalty for carrying 011 a business without a license required 
bylaw. 
[ 5 J Section 16240 of the Business and Professions Code 
provides that" Every person who commences or carries on any 
business, trade, profession, or calling, for the transaction or 
carrying on of which a license is required by any law of this 
State, without taking out or procuring the license prescribed 
by such la,v, is guilty of a midemeanor." The Legislature 
added this section to the Business and Professions Code in 
1941 at which time it repealed the identical provisions of 
section 435 of the Penal Code. At that time it was settled that 
a city ordinance was a law of this state within the meaning 
of section 435. (Teachout v. Bogy, 175 Cal. 481, 484-485 [166 
P. 319] ; Ex parte Bagshaw, 152 Cal. 701, 703 [93 P. 864] : 
In re Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.App. 465,467; see also Oounty of 
Plumas v. Wheeler, 149 Cal. 758, 768 rS7 P. 909] ; Ex parte 
Stephen, 114 Cal. 278, 282 [46 P. 86].) By transferring the 
statute from the Penal Code to the Business and Professions 
Code the Legislature did not change the meaning of its terms. 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2.) 
[6 J Petitioner was charged with the misdemeanor of 
operating his business" without having first secured a business 
May 1960] IN RE GROVES 
[54 C.2d 15-4: 4 Cal.Rotr. 844. 351 P.2d I0:l81 
159 
license as requireu by Section 2111 of Division 2 of the 'Palm 
Springs Ordinance Coue.' " These allegations state the precise 
facts madc a misdemeanor by section 16240 of the Business 
and Professions Code. Petitioner was therefore fully informeu 
of the charges against him and iu no way prejudiced by the 
failure of the complaint to cite section 16240. Under these 
circumstances failure to cite this section in the complaint is 
not grounds for setting aside the judgment on habeas corpus. 
As stated in In re Mingo, 190 Cal. 769, 7il [214 P. 850], "The 
mere fact that the complaint alleged a violation of the county 
ordinance instead of the state law' would not render the judg-
ment void in so far as the facts alleged and proved showed a 
violation of the state law .... " (See also In re 'J[urphy, 190 
Cal. 286, 291-293 [212 P. 30] ; Ex parte Stephen, $Ilpra, 114 
Cal. 278, 283; Ex parte Tay/or, 87 Cal. 91, 95 [25 P. 258] ; 
In re Jingles, 27 Ca1.2d496, 499 [165 P.2d 12] ; III re Simmons, 
199 CaL 590, 595 [250 P. 684] ; Olivieri v. Police Court of 
Bakersfield, 62 Cal.App. 91, 94-95 [216 P. 44].) 
[7] Petitioner contends that it is a denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws to enforce the criminal penalties of the city 
ordinance against those not required to have state licenses but 
not to enforce such penalties against those required to have 
such licenses. The penalties of the ordinance have not been 
invoked against petitioner in this case, however, and section 
16240 of the Business and Professions Code, which he violated, 
applies equally to all persons required to have licenses. 
Since petitioner's attack on the judgment cannot prevail, 
no purpose would be served by considering other questions 
raised in the return to the order to show cause or the technical 
objections to the form of the return raised in petitioner's 
motion to strike it. 
The motion to strike the return is denied. The order to show 
cause is discharged, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
is denied, and petitioner is remanded to custody. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J. pro tern.,· 
concurred. 
SCHAUEH, J., Dissenting.-I agree that under existing 
law the city may properly impose a tax for revenue purposes 
upon the business of petitioner. Such tax creates a civil debt 
tiue from petitioner to the city. Whether the city may properly 
enforce collection of that debt by penal sanction through an 
• Assi~necl hy Chairman of Judicial Council. 
") 
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ordinance appropriate to that end is not an issue now be-
fore us. 
I do 110t agrec that on thc record which is before us peti-
tioner's conviction can bc sustained on the theoryinvokecl by 
the majority. According to the petition and the rcturn the 
charge on which petitioner was brought to trial is as follows: 
"That the Crime of Misuemcanor, to-wit, Violation of Section 
2111 of Division 2 of the 'Palm Springs Ordinance Code,' has 
been committed by the above-named defendant as follows: 
That said defendant on or about the 13th day of November, 
1959, operated an ice crcam emporium known as the 'Pink 
Palace,' at 182 South Indian Ave in the said City of Palm 
Springs, without having first securcd a business license as 
required by Section 2111 of Division 2 of the 'Palm Springs 
Ordinance Code.' " 
1\:[ere reading of the above quoted charge from the complaint 
discloses that the only crime charged is "the Crime of Mis-
demeanor, to-wit, Violation of Section 2111 of Division 2 of 
the 'Palm Springs Ordinance Code.'" But the majority, 
while admitting as they must that section 2132.1 of the Palm 
Springs Ordinance Code provides that "The criminal penal-
ties provided for by this Code shall not be applied to busi-
nesses •.. requiring a State license ... nor as a method 
of obtaining collection of the license fees," seek to circum-
vent the city's proscription of penal sanction by invoking 
section 16240 of the state's Business and Professions Code. 
That state la,v provides that "Every person who commences 
or carries on any business . . . for the transaction or carrying 
on of which a license is required by any law of this State, 
without ..• procuring the license prescribed by such law, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor." 
To support this ingenious theory the majority say that" A 
city ordinance is a 'law of this State' within the meaning of 
this section" and remand petitioner to custody. 
Two obstacles preclude my concurrence: 1. As hereinabove 
shown the petitioner has been charged solely with "Violation 
of Section 2111 of Division 2 of the' Palm Springs Ordinance 
Code' " and he has never (at least not in any relevant pro-
ceeding) been charged with, or brought to trial for, violation 
of Business and Professions Code, section 16240. 
2. Whether petitioner could, on the facts shown by the 
petition and return, be successfully charged with, tried on, 
and convicted for, violation of Business and Professions Code, 
section 16240, is something which probably no court should 
) 
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assume to determine without the full procedures essential to 
a fair trial on sudl charge ha .... ing been had. In auy event it 
appears here that petitioner will be denied due process if he 
is remanded on the theory of the majority. 
In the petition it is alleged, and in the return is 110t denied, 
"That this petitioner is licensed by the State of California, 
Department of Agrieulture as a manufacturer of ice cream 
produces, License No. 13086, Factory No. 4825, File No. 447861 
18 Ll\fA. That the factory premises are at the complained of 
place of business at 182 South Indian Avenue in the City of 
Palm Springs, California." Petitioner further alleges "that 
he is under the rule of Agllew vs. Culre)" City, asset forth in 
the original Petition herein, so that he is being depri .... ed of his 
property without 'due process of law,' as set forth herein-
above" and "that he is duly licensed by the State of Cali-
fornia, Department of Agriculture under Code 661,' as a li-
censed manufacturer and purveyor of milk and ice cream 
products. " 
Examination of California's state Agricultural Code, Divi-
sion IV, discloses an elaborate and detailed code of laws gov-
erning the production, processing, manufacturing and market-
ing of "Milk and Dairy Products," whieh encom!Jasses the 
business petitioner commenced in Palm Springs. The state 
code requires, among other things, the procurement of licenses 
or permits for various operations including the business in 
which petitioner was engaged, and prescribes penalties for 
violations of the requirements. Likewise, examination of the 
Business and Professions Code reveals more than 16 pages of 
index devoted to the one word" Licenses" in relation to "any 
business, trade, profession, or calling, for the transaction or 
carrying on of which a license is required by any law of this 
State," and in respect to which section 16240 provides that 
"Every person who commences or carries on any [such 
activity] ... without taking out or procuring the license 
prescribed by suck law, is guilty of a misdemeanor." (Italics 
added.) Petitioner's undenied possession of the above de-
scribed "license prescribed by such law" would appear to 
constitute a prima facie (if not conclusi .... e) defense to a charge 
of violating "such law." 
If it is not altogether clear that section 16240 in its use of 
the words i'required by any law of this State" means just 
what it says-a law of this state and not an ordinance of a 
city-the question is at least substantial enough to entitle a 
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him with violation or the idl'utifielllaw before convicting and 
remanding him. 
In l"Ollllectioll with the proper construction of section 16240 
it of course should be notcd that such section appears in 
chapter 3, part 1, division VII of the Business and Profes-
sions Code. Chapter 3 includes the subheadings of "Defini-
tions" (art. 1), "Actions" (art. 2) and "Penaltics" (art. 3). 
Reference to articles 1 and 2 shows that they are concerned 
exclusiYely with state and not county or city laws. For 
example, section 16204 declares that" 'Officer' includes di-
rector, chief, commissioner, chairman, department, division, 
bureau, commission, board and any other person, officer or 
employee, and any agency, of or in the Government of this 
State." (Consistently, if the majoritY'8 view is correct, the 
above quoted language should be deemed to include "mayor, I 
councilman, city police officer, city treasurer," etc.) Section 
16201 says that" 'Fee' includes every tax, fee, pell<Ilty and 
other monetary exaction, and interest and costs in connection 
therewith, imposed or collected in connection with or as a 
prerequisite to or condition for the issuance, renewal or con-
tinued validity of any license, certificate or registration re-
quired by law." (Italics added; presumably, by the ma-
jority's view the word" fee" should be understood to include 
the Palm Springs city license fee.) Section 16224 provides 
that" All sums collected in suits under this chapter shall be 
reported to the Controller and deposited in the State Treasury 
to the credit of the fund in which would be deposited the fee, 
tax or charge for which the suit was brought." If Palm 
Springs can rely on Business and Professions Code, section 
16240, for collection of the "license" fee imposed by its ordi-
nance or a "penalty" imposed by state law then it would 
seem to follow that such fee or penalty when collected should 
be paid over, not to the treasurer of Palm Springs, but to the 
State Treasury of California. 
Regardless of any such problem as is last above mentioned 
it appears more reasonable to me to construe the language of 
section 16240 in the light of its context in chapter 3 of the 
Business and Professions Code (hereinabove described and 
quoted in part) and to relate its reaeh to the enforcement of 
state laws which it purports to cont('mplate rather than to 
city ordinances enacted exclusively for revenue purposes of 
the city and concerning which the city's code expressly de-
clares that" The crim inal penalties provided for by this Code 
shall not be applied . . . as a method of obtaining collection 
.') 
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of the licellse fees." It is, of eourse, our (lllt,\", w111>;'e the 
applieable law is UllC'erlain, to resoh'e ally u!lcertainty in 
favor of the accuscd person. (In I'C Tartar (19:j9). 52 Ca1.2d 
250, 256-~:H [9, 10] [339 P.~d 553] ; Chessman \'. SlIperior 
COll1't (1958),50 Ca1.2d 83:1, 843 [6J [330 P.2tl 22;)1; l'eople 
v. Cal'skaddon (1957),49 Cal.2d 42:1.427 [6] [:318 P.2t1 4]; 
People v. Stuart (1936), 47 Cal.~d 167, 173 [7] [302 P.2d 
5,55 A.L.H.2d 703] ; Peoplc Y. Smith \1933),44 Ca1.2d 77, 79 
[2] [279 P.2d 33]; In I'C Brall!bie (1047), 31 Ca1.2tl 43, 51 
[6, 7] [187 P.2el 411] ; III rc JleViekcrs (1046), ~9 Ca1.2d 
264,278 [176 P.2d 40] ; People Y. Yalc1/fi~lc (1!l4G), 28 Ca1.2d 
121,143 [20] [169 P.2d 1]; People Y. Ralph (1944),24 Cal. 
2d 575, 581 [2] [130 P.2d 401] ; Ex parte Ros()l7Icilll (1890), 
83 Cal. 388, 3n [23 P. 372].) 
For the reaSOllS hereinabove related I dissent from the ma-
jority holding, aJ1l1 if ther~ be no tenable basis for sustaining 
the conviction of petitioner (\\'hieh i<:sue, as indicated at the 
outset of this dis<:cnt, I do not rrach but as to which the ma-
jority have failed to find a supportable theory) the writ should 
be granted. 
McComh, J., concurred. 
Petitioner's appliration for a rehearing' was (lenirn. .Tllllr 8, 
1960. Sl'llll.Uer, .T., and. MrComb, J., were of the opinion that 
the application should be granted. 
